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INTRODUCTION

In North America, Indigenous peoples have lived, governed,
stewarded, and spiritually connected to places, territories, and homelands
since time immemorial. 1 With European invasion in the Western
Hemisphere, genocide was perpetrated along the east coast of the continent
and spread to other areas. Turtle Island, as it is lovingly called by Indigenous
peoples, was given to Native peoples by the Creator. 2 By the late 1400s to
1700s, invaders caused the lands to be a bloody battleground as the
Europeans, including the British, Dutch, French, Portuguese, Russian, and
Spanish, brought their conflicts over power and territory to this
hemisphere. 3 Early on, Tribal Nations engaged in commerce with the
newcomers, but soon turned to defending their peoples and lands. 4
As Europeans targeted the Western Hemisphere for exploitation
of natural resources by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 5 the Native
peoples in Central America were subjected to enslavement, torture, and
complete annihilation as the European Spanish male military seized Native
lands and resources that had been stewarded and were intended for future
generations of Native societies. 6 The encomienda system established by
Spanish colonizers condemned Indigenous peoples to lives of forced labor,
every form of abuse and maltreatment, and the attempted destruction of
ǂ Co-Director,

Native American Law and Sovereignty (NALS) Institute and Professor of Law,
Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
ǂǂ My Dakota name is included. This Article is dedicated to the amazing law students I have
had the honor to teach throughout my years as a law professor. To those who now represent
Tribal Nations, I encourage you to keep holding on to a vision of justice for the generations
to come.
See Angelique EagleWoman, Indigenous Historic Trade in the Western Hemisphere, in
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: BUILDING EQUITABLE AND INCLUSIVE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, 43, 44–45 (John Borrows & Risa
Schwartz eds., 2020) [hereinafter EagleWoman, Indigenous Historic Trade].
Joyce Tekahnawiiaks King, The Value of Water and the Meaning of Water Law for the
Native Americans Known as the Haudenosaunee, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 466
(2007).
Angelique EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding Commercial Prosperity in
1

2

3

Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints—Recommendations for Economic Revitalization in Indian
Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383, 388–89 (2008).
See ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED

4

STATES 57–59 (2014).
See generally JACK WEATHERFORD, INDIAN GIVERS: HOW THE INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS
TRANSFORMED THE WORLD (1989).
DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 34, 59; Angelique EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic
5

6

Experience of Genocide for American Indians and Alaska Natives in the United States: The
Call to Recognize Full Human Rights as Set Forth in the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 424, 426–28 (2015) [hereinafter
EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide].
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Indigenous governance, culture, and spiritual ceremonies. 7 To the north,
many Tribal Nations were willing to educate, enter peaceful relations, and
develop longstanding treaty relationships with the men from British, Dutch,
French, and Russian origins. 8 This willingness to trade, interact, and
intermarry was viewed as an opportunity to exploit the lands, peoples, and
cultures of the Western Hemisphere. 9
For Tribal Nation leaders, the newcomers were often received
with sympathy and allowed in the communal circle with hospitality. 10 A long
tradition of alliances, confederacies, and treaty-making had been the norm
in the Americas prior to European arrival. 11 The basis of the tribal worldview
is kinship and obligations based on the status of relatives in an
interdependent living world. 12 In some societies, prophecies foretold of
cataclysmic change that would ensue upon the arrival of foreigners, but
nothing could fully prepare the tribal governments sustainably managing
large territories for the onslaught that occurred in the 1600s and 1700s
across North America. 13
II.

DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY, BRITISH TREATY-MAKING
TO U.S. TREATY-MAKING

To justify the invasion and claiming of Indigenous peoples’
homelands, Christianity and Roman Catholic church officials supplied
doctrine and documentation granting authority to European monarchs to
subdue Indigenous peoples, characterized as “pagans,” “infidels,” and nonChristians, establish authority over trade networks, and gain superior title to
their lands. 14 “In fact, the language that English monarchs used in the
charters they granted to the American colonists was derived from Pope
Alexander VI’s Inter catera ([1493]), the legal basis for Spanish possession

EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide, supra note 6, at 426–28.
See ROBERT WILLIAMS, LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS
OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800, 21–28 (1st ed. 1997).
DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 144.
WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 28.
Id. at 32–33.
EagleWoman, Indigenous Historic Trade, supra note 1, at 48–49.
Stephen A. Colston, “No Longer Will There Be a Mexico”: Omens, Prophecies, and the
Conquest of the Aztec Empire, 9 AM. INDIAN Q. 239-258 (1985). For a recent example of
the Black Snake Lakota prophecy and the resistance efforts to the Dakota Access Pipeline
see Danielle Delaney, Under Coyote’s Mask: Environmental Law, Indigenous Identity, and
#NODAPL, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 299, 300 (2019); Andrew Rome, The Black Snake on
the Periphery: The Dakota Access Pipeline and Tribal Jurisdictional Sovereignty, 93 N.D.
L. REV. 57, 58 (2018).
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[1] (Nell Jessup Newton ed. 2012)
[hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
7
8

9

10
11
12
13

14

2021]

PERMANENT HOMELANDS THROUGH TREATIES

643

of the Americas (except Brazil).” 15 The kings of England would assert
authority to convert Indigenous peoples to Christianity as justification for
invasion, monopolizing trade, and the seizing of Indigenous lands in
charters. 16 Thus, Europeans, including British, Portuguese, and Spanish
men, claimed superior title and authority by stepping foot on Indigenous
lands armed with legal arguments based on the Christian doctrine of
discovery. 17 “The Doctrine provided that Europeans automatically acquired
property rights in native lands and gained governmental, political, and
commercial rights over the indigenous inhabitants without their knowledge
or consent.” 18
In the northernmost areas of the continent, British, French, and
Dutch men infiltrated Indigenous commerce networks under the guise of
partnership and kinship. They built wooden structures and declared
themselves permanently established, although under legal principles, their
claims were little more than squatters’ rights. British, French, and Dutch
men often sought Indigenous wives to garner the trust of commercial
partners. 19 The abandonment of the Indigenous families that resulted upon
the emigration of European women often deprived the first wives from a
share in the commercial ventures made possible by those common law
marriages. 20 With intermarriage and trade relationships, European officials
began to understand certain aspects of Tribal Nations’ governance, societal
obligations, and territories. 21
The British monarchy sent men under the authority of its charters
to build warehouse structures and enter commercial relationships with
promises of kinship and loyalty to Tribal Nations and peoples. Examples of
this practice include the charters by King James I for the 1606 Virginia
Company and the 1606 Plymouth Company, 22 and by King Charles II for
the 1670 Hudson Bay Company. 23 These companies led to the British
James Muldoon, Discovery, Grant, Charter, Conquest, or Purchase: John Adams on the
Legal Basis for English Possession of North America, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY
15

AMERICA, 31 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001).
Id. at 34–36.
Robert J. Miller, American Indians, The Doctrine of Discovery, and Manifest Destiny, 11
WYO. L. REV. 329, 330 (2011).
16
17

18

Id.

Bethany Berger, After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934, 21 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 25–28 (1997).
See id. at 5, 26, 42.
Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimensions of Nineteenth Century Immigration Law, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1409–13 (2009).
See Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A Historical Rejoinder to
the Claim of “University Recognition” of the Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
481, 523-525 (2006).
See Robert J. Miller, The International Law of Colonialism: A Comparative Analysis, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 847, 869–872 (2011).
19

20
21

22

23
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monarchy chartering colonies by the mid-1600s for permanent settlement
in North America. 24 To ensure the longevity of these activities and
monopolize certain aspects of trade, the British monarchy sought treaty
agreements with Tribal Nation leadership. 25 Over time, land-hungry
colonists defied British treaty relationships and began to claim territory from
direct conveyances with Tribal Nations or simply by staking claim to tribal
lands. French nationalists sought alignment with Tribal Nations against the
British to continue their European-based tug-of-war. 26 This led to what is
commonly referred to as the “French and Indian War” in North America,
or the “Seven Years War” when referring to the conflict originating in
Europe. 27
In the aftermath of the war, King George III recognized the need
to maintain boundaries as agreed upon with Tribal Nations. 28 Ironically,
historians have referred to the tribal military actions during this time period
as Indian “uprisings” rather than as actual wars against the European
invaders. 29 To be clear, an uprising is defined as “a usually localized act of
popular violence in defiance of usually an established government.” 30 More
accurately, Tribal Nations were defending their territories and governments
against the uprisings of the opportunistic invaders from British and French
backgrounds as tribal governments were the established governments in
North America in the mid-1700s.
As the intentions of the British and French revealed themselves,
Indigenous leaders demanded adherence to official agreements, alliances,
and boundaries to ensure long-term peaceful interactions and stability. 31
Watson, supra note 22, at 527–531.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[1].
Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 405, 424–25 (2003).
See id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
See BERNARD KNOLLENBERG, ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1759-1766, 103–
04 (1960) (describing the tribal military efforts to expel the British from tribal territories from
May 1763 to March 1764).
Amherst’s contribution to provoking the uprising is, however, only part
of the story. The other is the failure of the British army, when the longthreatened rebellion at last broke out, to protect the Pennsylvania and
Virginia frontiers from the horrors of Indian raids or to carry out
Amherst’s confident threat of prompt and crushing punishment of any
Indians who might dare rebel.
24
25
26

27
28
29

Id.

Uprising, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/uprising [https://perma.cc/ZAL4-4RD6].
Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Doctrine of Discovery: Aboriginal Title, Tribal
30

31

Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy
in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 722–23 (2004).
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With the Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued by King George III of England
in the aftermath of defeating French military forces aligned with some Tribal
Nations, settlement by British subjects was curtailed west of the Appalachian
Mountains in line with prior treaty agreements with Tribal Nations. 32
Relevant text of the Proclamation provided for the removal of British
subjects as follows:
And we do further strictly enjoin and require all Persons
whatever who have either wilfully or inadvertently seated
themselves upon any Lands within the Countries above
described. or upon any other Lands which, not having
been ceded to or purchased by Us, are still reserved to the
said Indians as aforesaid, forthwith to remove themselves
from such Settlements. 33
The Proclamation further denied legal authority or action by any individual
seeking to purchase lands, and required information be supplied to
government officials if Tribal Nation leaders expressed a willingness to sell
their lands.
And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been
committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great
Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction
of the said Indians: In order, therefore, to prevent such
Irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians
may be convinced of our Justice and determined
Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent,
We do, with the Advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin
and require, that no private Person do presume to make
any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved
to the said Indians, within those parts of our Colonies
where We have thought proper to allow Settlement[.] 34
Finally, this Royal Proclamation provided that individuals secure licenses to
trade with Tribal Nations that were issued by British government officials.
Various colonial governments enacted similar regulations for commercial
transactions involving Indigenous tradespeople and British subjects. 35 As
many colonists were land speculators, they were angered by the restraints
imposed on seizing tribal lands. 36

COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[1].
JOHN J. BORROWS & LEONARD I. ROTMAN, ABORIGINAL LEGAL ISSUES: CASES,
MATERIALS & COMMENTARY 16 (5th ed. 2018).
Id. at 16–17.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[1].
32
33

34
35
36

Id.
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The Treaty of Niagara in 1764

The next year, the largest gathering of Tribal Nations with British
officials occurred, leading to the Treaty of Niagara entered on August 1,
1764. 37 The meeting was viewed as establishing a multinational agreement
and implementing the Royal Proclamation of 1763 through assurances of
alliance with the British representatives. 38
The treaty at Niagara was entered into in July and August
of 1764, and was regarded as ‘the most widely
representative gathering of American Indians ever
assembled,’ as approximately two thousand chiefs attended
the negotiations. There were over twenty-four Nations
gathered with ‘representative nations as far east as Nova
Scotia, and as far west as Mississippi, and as far north as
Hudson Bay.’ It is also possible that representatives from
even further afield participated in the treaty as some
records indicate that the Cree and Lakota (Sioux) nations
were also present at this event. It is obvious that a
substantial number of First Nations people attended the
gathering at Niagara. Aboriginal people throughout the
Great Lakes and northern, eastern, and western colonial
regions had travelled for weeks and months to attend this
meeting. 39
Yet, this historic event is largely left out of the history of North America.
This event led to the expectation of good faith by Tribal Nations as they
relied on statements and actions from the British officials and colonists
present at the meeting. “At this gathering, a nation-to-nation relationship
between settler and First Nation peoples was renewed and extended, and
the Covenant Chain of Friendship, a multinational alliance in which no
member gave up their sovereignty, was affirmed.” 40 During the treaty
council, in keeping with tribal political culture, the British officials
exchanged gifts, wampum, and other items of value to demonstrate good
faith within kinship relations. 41
Following the rule of law, the British officials present at the
meeting, under the authority of the King of England, promised to act in
good faith towards the Tribal Nations and respect their lands and
John Borrows, Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History,
and Self-Government, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA: ESSAYS ON LAW,
37

EQUALITY, AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE 155, 161, 169 (Michael Asch ed., 1997).
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 163.
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governments. 42 Within the tribal concept of kinship, both good faith and
security in promises were viewed as adhering to a spiritual higher natural
law sealed with gift exchanges, words of promise, and ceremonial prayers. 43

B.

British Colonies form the United States of America

Shifting sands once more permeated the foundation for Tribal
Nation relations with the Europeans living in villages on Native soil when
the British leaders of colonies rejected the authority of the British
monarchy. This phase of British warfare has been commonly referred to as
the American Revolution by U.S. historians, dated approximately 1775 to
1783. 44 As the rebellion gained traction, Tribal Nations were at times
regarded as strategic allies, in some instances lending military forces and
reinforcements. 45
The United States issued a declaration of independence on July
4, 1776. 46 As the newly-formed nation-state, the first treaty it entered into
was the Treaty with the Delawares on September 17, 1778. 47 Article II of
the Treaty expressed “perpetual peace and friendship . . . through all
succeeding generations.” 48 In Article III, the Delaware Nation pledged to
allow free passage of U.S. troops engaged in warfare with the King of
England through Delaware lands, to provide “corn, meat, horses, or
whatever may be in their power for the accommodation of such troops,”
and “such a number of their best and most expert warriors as they can
spare.” 49
In return, the Delaware Nation received many promises. The
United States pledged “to guarantee to the aforesaid nation of Delawares,
and their heirs, all their territorial rights in the fullest and most ample
42
43

COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[1].
See WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 125.

Indians insist on acts of commitment from their treaty partners—signs
that human beings, in a world of diversity and conflict, can learn to trust
each other. Smoking the pipe of peace, taking hold of a treaty partner
by the hand, exchanging hostages, and presenting valuable gifts were just
some of the ways human beings could demonstrate steadfast
commitment to upholding their treaty relationships.

Id.
See, e.g., KNOLLENBERG, supra note 29, at xxi.
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.02[2].
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
44
45
46

Treaty with the Delawares, Delaware-U.S., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, reprinted in 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 3 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904),
https://dc.library.okstate.edu/digital/collection/kapplers/id/25854 [https://perma.cc/7NG3MCCG] [hereinafter KAPPLER’S].
Id. at Art. II.
Id. at Art. III.
47

48
49
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manner.” 50 The Delaware Nation was to invite other Tribal Nations to the
confederation under the Treaty, with the Delaware Nation as the head. 51 In
terms of political relationships, the United States further promised the
Delaware Nation to “have a representation in Congress.” 52 It should be
noted that these promises were not kept by the United States as the
Delaware Nation eventually was scattered by warfare and fought to establish
a permanent homeland in what is now Oklahoma. 53
III.

PERMANENT HOMELANDS AND TREATY RELATIONSHIPS

As the former British subjects sought to gain property and
establish land rights, treaty relationships were viewed as necessary tools for
the expansion of the newly declared nation-state. The first U.S. president,
George Washington, viewed treaties as expedient means to dispossess
Tribal Nations of their lands, instead of engaging in warfare. 54 This was a
far cry from the rule of law when Washington considered treaties with
Tribal Nations.
For example, in a letter penned by Washington in 1783, he
detailed his views on policy for Indian affairs to James Duane. Washington
made clear his lack of principles or adherence to good faith with Tribal
Nations.
At first view, it may seem a little extraneous, when I am
called upon to give an opinion upon the terms of a Peace
proper to be made with the Indians, that I should go into
the formation of New States; but the Settlemt. [sic] of the
Western Country and making a Peace with the Indians are
so analogous that there can be no definition of the other.
For I repeat it, again, and I am clear in my opinion, that
policy and occonomy [sic] point very strongly to the
expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and
the propriety of purchasing their Lands in preference to
attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their
Country; which as we have already experienced is like
driving the Wild Beasts of the Forest which will return as
soon as the pursuit is at an end and fall perhaps on those
left there; when the gradual extension of our Settlements
will as certainly cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire, both
50
51
52

Id. at Art. VI.
Id.
Id.

Nekole Alligood, The History of Delaware Nation, DELAWARE NATION,
https://www.delawarenation-nsn.gov/history/ [https://perma.cc/SW5G-ZRD7].
See EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience, supra note 6, at 431–32.
53

54
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being beasts of prey tho’ [sic] they differ in shape. In a word
there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian War but the
Soil they live on and without that bloodshed and those
distresses which helpless Women and Children are made
partakers of in all kinds of disputes with them. 55
From this statement of policy, the man who became the first leader of the
United States of America did not intend to uphold the rule of law with
Tribal Nations as he viewed tribal peoples as “beasts” and as “savage.” 56
These racist views of American Indians as less than human and enemies
were hidden in the formal treaty councils where U.S. officials traveled to the
seats of tribal governments to enter into legal agreements. 57

A.

U.S. Constitution and Tribal Nations

With the adoption of the U.S Constitution on September 17,
1787, tribal governments and American Indians are mentioned only a few
times. Tribal Nations were not parties, nor were they consulted on the
document. In Article I, Section 8, the U.S. Congress has the authority “[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes.” 58 In the original Article I, Section 2, clause 3, a
formula for taxation was set forth and contained the language “excluding
Indians not taxed.” 59 As American Indians were not citizens of the United
States, no taxation was assessed, and state representation was tied to
taxation.
The role of treaties in the U.S. Constitution is outlined in both
the authority of the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate, and the hierarchy of
federal law. Under the Presidential Power set forth in Article II, Section 2,
the U.S. President has the authority as follows: “He shall have power, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
55
56

FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 2 (2000).

See id.

Natsu Taylor Saito, Race and Decolonization: Whiteness as Property in the American
Settler Colonial Project, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 31, 52 (2015).
57

Within their system of property relations, the title they have granted
themselves gives the settlers the right to forcibly remove American
Indians from lands they have occupied since time immemorial, to
slaughter them at will, to imprison them, and to dictate how they will
live. By racializing Indians as savage, warlike, nomadic, and without law,
the settlers have attempted to reconcile these actions with their selfappointed “civilizing mission” and their “American values” of freedom
and democracy.
Id.; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian
Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 166–67 (2008).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
58
59
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two thirds of the Senators present concur.” 60 Thus, the U.S. Senate serves
as further approval for the agreement to enter into a treaty. The Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in Article VI provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding. 61
These are the key rules of law for treaty-making by the United States.
Between 1778 and 1871, the United States entered into over four
hundred treaties with Tribal Nations throughout mid-North America. 62 The
early treaties identified the power and strength of Tribal Nations as allies to
the United States in its warfare against former kinsmen, the British. 63 Land
purchases, called cessions, were the most common provisions of the treaty
agreements with Tribal Nations. 64 The United States sought to expand and
promised allegiance to Tribal Nations as good faith partners in friendship
that was “perpetual.” 65
Under an appropriations act in 1871, the U.S. Congress set forth
a change in the policy of the United States on treaty-making with Tribal
Nations as follows:
No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
ANGELIQUE EAGLEWOMAN & STACY LEEDS, MASTERING AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 11 (2d
ed. 2019).
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at § 1.03[1].
Id. at § 1.03[1].
See Treaty with the Delawares, Delaware-U.S., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, reprinted in
KAPPLER’S, supra note 47, at 3 (“Article 2. That a perpetual peace and friendship shall from
henceforth take place, and subsist between the contracting parties aforesaid, through all
succeeding generations.”); Treaty with the Iowa, Sept. 16, 1815, 7 Stat. 136, reprinted in
KAPPLER’S, supra note 47, at 123 (“Article 2. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship
between all the citizens of the United States and all the individuals composing the said Iaway
[sic] tribe or nation.”); Treaty with the Sioux-Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands, Sioux-U.S., July
23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949, reprinted in KAPPLER’S, supra note 47, at 588 (“Article 1. It is
stipulated and solemnly agreed that the peace and friendship now so happily existing between
the United States and the aforesaid bands of Indians, shall be perpetual.”); Treaty with the
Eastern Shoshoni, Eastern Shoshoni-U.S., July 12, 1863, 18 Stat. 685, reprinted in
KAPPLER’S, supra note 47, at 848 (“Article 1. Friendly and amically [sic] relations are hereby
re-established between the bands of the Shoshonee nation, parties hereto, and the United
States; and it is declared that a firm and perpetual peace shall be henceforth maintained
between the Shoshonee nation and the United States.”).
60
61
62

63
64
65
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States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty
lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or
impaired. Such treaties, and any Executive orders and Acts
of Congress under which the rights of any Indian tribe to
fish are secured, shall be construed to prohibit (in addition
to any other prohibition) the imposition under any law of
a State or political subdivision thereof of any tax on any
income derived from the exercise of rights to fish secured
by such treaty, Executive order, or Act of Congress if
section 7873 of title 26 does not permit a like Federal tax
to be imposed on such income. 66
While this signaled to the U.S. President that future agreements would not
be funded by appropriations acts, the impact was to “make agreements with
the Indians, but now both houses [of Congress] approved them.” 67 These
new methods of recognizing reservations and transacting land cessions were
“virtually identical to those established by treaties.” 68
There seemed to be multiple mental gymnastics in changing the
rule of law regarding treaty/political relationships between Tribal Nations
and the United States to the status desired by the United States of total
control over tribal lands and peoples.
Tribal Nations are extra-constitutional, meaning there is no
role for tribal governments in the U.S. Constitution, and
furthermore, the Tribes have never consented to
participate in the U.S. constitutional structure. Without
identifying any constitutional foundation, federal courts
classify the relationship between Tribes and the U.S.
government as political, and affirm that the U.S. Congress
has “plenary” authority over Tribes. In the U.S.
Constitution, the U.S. Congress has the ability “[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes” and this one
phrase has been stretched into “plenary” authority over
Tribal Nations. 69
This re-characterization and twisting of the law from the U.S. Constitution
as applied to American Indians and their governments can be found in all
three branches of the United States, from the U.S. Congress to the U.S.
Supreme Court to the U.S. Executive. This will be discussed more fully
below.
66
67
68

25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988).
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.03[9].

Id.

Angelique EagleWoman, Bringing Balance to Mid-North America: Re-Structuring the
Sovereign Relationships Between Tribal Nations and the United States, 41 U. BALT. L. REV.

69

671, 678 (2012).
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Status of American Indians and Imposition of U.S. Naturalization
in 1924

American Indians formed their own governments as Tribal
Nations since time immemorial in the Western Hemisphere. They were
not U.S. citizens when the U.S. Constitution was adopted or amended. In
the first section of the April 9, 1866, Civil Rights Act, the citizens of the
United States were described as “all persons born in the United States, and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.” 70 The
acknowledgment of American Indians as citizens of Tribal Nations and not
the United States continued after the formal adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in July 1868. 71
In Elk v. Wilkins, 72 the U.S. Supreme Court expressly stated that
American Indians had to undergo a naturalization process to become
United States citizens. 73 “Since the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress has passed several acts for naturalizing Indians of
certain tribes, which would have been superfluous if they were, or might
become without any action of the government, citizens of the United
States.” 74 Mr. Elk had been refused the ability to vote in Nebraska elections
as an Indian, although he had severed all ties with his tribal government. 75
In denying his right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, 76 the Court stated:
But the question whether any Indian tribes, or any
members thereof, have become so far advanced in
civilization, that they should be let out of the state of
pupilage, and admitted to the privileges and responsibilities
of citizenship, is a question to be decided by the nation

70
71

See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27–30.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Id.

112 U.S. 94 (1884).
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 95.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”).
72
73
74
75
76
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whose wards they are and whose citizens they seek to
become, and not by each Indian for himself. 77
Thus, the U.S. Constitutional provisions “excluding Indians not taxed” have
been interpreted as an acknowledgment that Tribal Nations contained
citizens as “Indians” that were outside of the legal status of U.S. citizens. 78
Over time, treaty provisions and federal laws recognized a dual citizenship
status for American Indians in federally recognized Tribal Nations. 79
Without the consent of Tribal Nations, the U.S. Congress in 1924
naturalized all American Indians as citizens with passage of the Indian
Citizenship Act (commonly called the Snyder Act). 80
As voting laws are within the authority of state governments,
American Indians in some states have been denied the right to vote in state
and federal elections up to recent memory, for example, in South Dakota
in the 1960s and 1970s. 81 Thus, American Indians have a political status as
dual citizens in maintaining reservation lands and tribal governments,
including both tribal citizenship and U.S. citizenship. 82

C.

Property Rights of Tribal Nations and the United States Through
Treaties

By entering into treaties with Tribal Nations, the United States
acquired territory and land title to assert jurisdiction and governance over.
Tribal Nations continued to assert governance and jurisdiction over
reserved lands known as reservations and cultural/sacred sites both on and
off reserved lands. 83 The rule of law was at times adhered to within the U.S.
government and courts and at other times completely flouted in favor of
legal fictions regarding the legal agreements with tribal governments. 84 With
the ambitions of the U.S. to expand and corral resources owned since time
immemorial by Indigenous governments, the rule of law was often twisted
into justifications for U.S. land grabs.

77
78
79
80

Wilkins, 112 U.S. at 106–107.
Id.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 14.01[1].
See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended

at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012)).
See Kaitlyn Schaeffer, The Need for Federal Legislation to Address Native Voter
Suppression, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 707, 712 (2019); see also Kristopher A.
Reed, Back to the Future: How the Holding of Shelby County v. Holder Has Been a Reality
for South Dakota Native Americans Since 1975, 62 S.D. L. REV. 143 (2017).
See Matthew L. Fletcher, Politics, Indian Law, and the Constitution, 108 CALIF. L. REV.
495, 532 (2020).
81

82

See id.
See Hope A. Babcock, The Stories We Tell, and Have Told, About Tribal Sovereignty:
Legal Fictions at Their Most Pernicious, 55 VILL. L. REV. 803 (2010).
83
84
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U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Mixing Religious/Racial Doctrine
with Law

In the 1800s, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of decisions,
skewed the property rights of Tribal Nations and diminished the legal status
of tribal governments. A set of three decisions, commonly called “the
Marshall Trilogy,” after U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall,
handed down a framework of diminished property and sovereignty rights of
tribal governments that remain in place today. 85 In the first decision of
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 86 the U.S. Supreme Court limited tribal government
property rights by incorporating the “doctrine of discovery” into U.S. law. 87
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great
nations of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves
so much of it as they could respectively acquire. Its vast
extent offered an ample field to the ambition and
enterprise of all; and the character and religion of its
inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a
people over whom the superior genius of Europe might
claim an ascendency. The potentates of the old world
found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they
made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new,
by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in
exchange for unlimited independence. But, as they were all
in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary, in
order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war
with each other, to establish a principle, which all should
acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition,
which they all asserted, should be regulated as between
themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to
the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority,
it was made, against all other European governments,
which title might be consummated by possession. 88
Embracing the edicts of the papal bulls in enunciating the “doctrine of
discovery” to grant Christians superior title to non-Christian lands, the U.S.
Supreme Court established the basis for dispossessing Tribal Nations of
their property through legal fictions. 89 The opinion provided that Indian
tribes lacked full ownership of their lands and instead held occupancy title

85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 825–30.

21 U.S. 543 (1823).

Id. at 572–73.
Id.
See Miller, supra note 17, at 335–36.
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at the whim of the United States government. 90 The United States as the
successor to Great Britain acquired superior title to all tribal lands through
the “doctrine of discovery.” 91 Further, the extinguishment of tribal
occupancy title could be accomplished in one of two ways: through purchase
or through conquest. 92
The second and third decisions focused on the treaties between
the Cherokee Nation and the United States. In the 1831 decision, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 93 the Tribal Nation brought suit when the state of Georgia
sought to assert its jurisdiction over Cherokee lands and nullify the
Cherokee government in their homelands. 94 Unbeknownst to the Cherokee
Nation, the United States promised in a subsequent agreement with the state
officials of Georgia that once the Cherokee Nation was removed from their
homelands, Georgia would have title to those lands. 95 When the United
States was slow to violate treaties with the Cherokee Nation, state officials
took matters into their own hands by surveying Cherokee lands, asserting
criminal jurisdiction over Cherokee citizens, and enforcing an oath of loyalty
to Georgia prior to White entry into Cherokee territory. 96
By reviewing the Indian Commerce Clause in the U.S.
Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall opined that Indian tribes were listed
separately from foreign nations and, therefore, lacked standing to bring a
90

Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original
inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to
be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to
retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion;
but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it.

Id.
Id. at 584–85.
Id. at 587.
91
92

Id.
93
94

The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and
broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They
hold, and assert in themselves, the title by which it was acquired. They
maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or
by conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty, as the
circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.

30 U.S. 1, 1 (1831).

Id. at 15.

COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.03[4][a].
Neyooxet Greymorning, The Anglocentric Supremacy of the Marshall Court, 10 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 191, 216 (2017).
95
96
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case into the federal court under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution. 97 Marshall created a new term in U.S. law for tribal
governments as “domestic dependent nations” and dismissed the action for
enforcement of the treaties entered into with the U.S. government. 98
Further, Marshall asserted that the Cherokee Nation, and all Indian tribes,
were in a ward/guardian relationship with the United States and in a state of
“pupilage.” 99 The opinion did not rely on the Supremacy Clause in the U.S.
Constitution where treaties are categorized as the supreme law of the land.
The rule of law was not adhered to in this opinion as the decision
sidestepped the legal obligations of the United States in treaties, forever
guaranteeing U.S. recognition of the Cherokee Nation reserved land base. 100
Next, suit was brought by U.S. citizen and missionary, Samuel
Worcester, who entered Cherokee Nation lands under the authority of the
U.S. government and the Cherokee leadership but refused to swear loyalty

97
98
99

Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 18–19.
Id. at 17.
Id.

They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their
will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of
possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.

Id.
Id. at 16.
100

Id.

The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize
them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war,
of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their
engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the
United States by any individual of their community. Laws have been
enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly
recognize the Cherokee Nation as a state, and the courts are bound by
those acts. A question of much more difficulty remains. Do the
Cherokees constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution?
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under state law to Georgia. 101 In Worcester v. Georgia, 102 the U.S. Supreme
Court could not sidestep the issue of whether Georgia law could override
federal law and treaties. In Marshall’s decision, there is a recognition of the
political and legal relationship between the Cherokee Nation and the U.S.
government, as evidenced in treaties. 103 “The treaties and laws of the United
States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of
the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on
exclusively by the government of the union.” 104 The holding from this
decision established that federal law pre-empted state law in Indian affairs.
These three decisions provided the framework in U.S. law to
undermine the rule of law for tribal governments as denying full property
ownership rights, denying full sovereign authority, imposing a ward/guardian
relationship, and setting up a tug of war between the federal and state
governments with the U.S. Supreme Court acting as mediator. 105 This
framework has become embedded in U.S. law, with these statements in
101

See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542 (1832).

It has been said at the bar, that the acts of the legislature of Georgia seize
on the whole Cherokee country, parcel it out among the neighbouring
[sic] counties of the state, extend her code over the whole country,
abolish its institutions and its laws, and annihilate its political existence.
If this be the general effect of the system, let us inquire into the effect of
the particular statute and section on which the indictment is founded. It
enacts that “all white persons, residing within the limits of the Cherokee
nation on the 1st day of March next, or at any time thereafter, without a
license or permit from his excellency the governor, or from such agent
as his excellency the governor shall authorise [sic] to grant such permit
or license, and who shall not have taken the oath hereinafter required,
shall be guilty of a high misdemeanour [sic], and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished by confinement to the penitentiary, at hard
labour [sic], for a term not less than four years.” The eleventh section
authorises [sic] the governor, “should he deem it necessary for the
protection of the mines, or the enforcement of the laws in force within
the Cherokee nation, to raise and organise [sic] a guard” . . . The
thirteenth section enacts, “that the said guard or any member of them,
shall be, and they are hereby authorised [sic] and empowered to arrest
any person legally charged with or detected in a violation of the laws of
this state, and to convey, as soon as practicable, the person so arrested,
before a justice of the peace, judge of the superior, or justice of interior
court of this state, to be dealt with according to law.”

Id.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 555 (“This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one
102
103

more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting
as subjects to the laws of a master.”).
Id. at 557.
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L. J.
579, 596 (2008).
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contravention of the sovereign-to-sovereign relationships with tribal
governments continuing to the present day. 106
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed jurisprudence upholding
treaty rights. 107 In doing so, the land title claimed by the U.S. under treaties
has been maintained through land cessions by Tribal Nations. 108 As the U.S.
Supreme Court has reviewed treaty instruments with Tribal Nations, the
Court established the Indian canons of construction to fairly interpret treaty
provisions. 109 Treaties were written in English by officials authorized by the
United States and often contained legal terminology not easily or effectively
translated into tribal languages. 110
The Indian canons of construction were developed over time and
are understood as interpretive tools which can be summarized as follows:
See Milner S. Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1183, 1193–94 (2000).
Some years ago, Felix Cohen frankly acknowledged that talk of
guardianship legitimates ‘congressional legislation that would have been
unconstitutional if applied to non-Indians.’ So was the moral obligation
invoked to extend United States criminal jurisdiction into reservations,
to take tribal property in violation of treaties, and to reduce Indian lands
under the Dawes Act (allotment) from 138,000,000 acres in 1887 to
48,000,000 by 1934. And so has the trust obligation been invoked as a
defense against paying just compensation for taking tribal property. The
Court has said that, when Congress acts ‘as trustee for the benefit of the
Indians, exercising its plenary powers over Indians and their property,
as it thinks in their best interests’ and ‘transmutes the property from land
to money, there is no taking’ in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
106

Id.
See U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
107

In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a
grant of right from them,-a reservation of those not granted. And the
form of the instrument and its language was adapted to that purpose.
Reservations were not of particular parcels of land, and could not be
expressed in deeds, as dealings between private individuals. The
reservations were in large areas of territory and the negotiations were
with the tribe. They reserved rights, however, to every individual Indian,
as though named therein. They imposed a servitude upon every piece
of land as though described therein. There was an exclusive right of
fishing reserved within certain boundaries.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 380–81.
108
109

Id.
See id.
110

And we have said we will construe a treaty with the Indians as ‘that
unlettered people’ understood it, and ‘as justice and reason demand, in
all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they
owe care and protection,’ and counterpoise the inequality ‘by the
superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right, without
regard to technical rules.’
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“1) treaties are to be construed as the Indians would have understood them,
2) any ambiguities are to be construed in favor of the Indian understanding
of the treaty document, and 3) all powers and rights are reserved to a Tribe
unless expressly relinquished in a treaty document.” 111 Over time, the Indian
canons of construction have been applied beyond treaty interpretation to
statutes, regulations, executive orders, and agreements intended to benefit
American Indians. 112 As interpretive tools, the U.S. Supreme Court has
discretion on whether to apply the Indian canons of construction and can
circumvent their application by finding no ambiguity requiring
interpretation or simply disregarding their application. 113

2.

Pendulum Swing of U.S. Indian Policy to Recognize or Eliminate
Tribal Nations

Scholars in the field of federal Indian law have likened the
shifting policy eras of the U.S. government to a pendulum swinging between
contradictory points, the recognition of the legal status of tribal
governments, and efforts to eliminate tribal governmental status. 114 The U.S.
Indian policy eras are chronologically: (1) Treaty Era of sovereign-to
sovereign relationships from 1778 to mid-1800s; (2) Removal Era of the
1800s; (3) Reservation Era of the 1800s; (4) Assimilation/Allotment Era of
the late-1800s through 1930s; (5) Indian Self-Government Era of the 1930s
through 1940s; (6) Termination of Self-Government Status Era of the 1940s
through 1960s; and (7) Indian Self-Determination Era of the late-1960s to
the present. 115

EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 62, at 12.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 2.02[1].
See Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court’s (Re)Construction of
the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 659 (2011).
These extra-judicial applications of the Justices' personal values pervade
Indian law jurisprudence and undercut the legitimacy of the Indian
canons. When tribes wield a ‘civilizing’ power-such as furthering
economic interests or acting as a private landowner-or when it fits with
the view of Indians as the guardians of nature who live off of the land,
the tribes are much more likely to prevail under the canons. If, however,
tribes assert their rights as governmental entities against non-Indians, the
Court views this power as having been implicitly divested.

111
112
113

Id.

Vine Deloria Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 979 (1996).
EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 62, at 10–22.
114

115

660

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

Government-to-Government
Relations
Treaty Era (sovereign-tosovereign)
1778 to Mid-1800s

[Vol. 47

Disregard of Tribal Nation Status
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1800s
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1800s
Assimilation/Allotment Era
Late 1800s to Early 1900s
Indian Self-Government Era
1930s to 1940s
Termination of Tribal
Government Status Era
1940s to 1960s
Indian Self-Determination Era
Late 1960s to Present

Figure 1. Depicting the U.S. government’s oscillation between recognition
of tribal governments as sovereign and annihilation of tribal sovereignty in
setting U.S. governmental Indian policy.
The foundational relationship for Tribal Nations with the United
States is the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship. In exercising sovereign
authority to enter into treaties and other agreements with the United States,
the Tribal Nations did not relinquish their status as tribal governments,
capable of all the characteristics of nation-states as understood in the
international political community. 116
Of course, the choice made by an Indian Nation to accept
the protection of the United States, or any other more
powerful sovereign, does nothing to diminish the capacity
of the Indian Nation to enter into, and fulfill, agreements
with other sovereigns. Likewise, the choice of the United
States to change its method of ratification of its contracts or
agreements with Indian Nations in no way diminishes the
capacity of Indian Nations to enter into international
agreements. Long after the end of the classical “treaty

See G. William Rice, Teaching Decolonization: Reacquisition of Indian Lands Within
and Without the Box—An Essay, 82 N. D. L. REV. 811, 823–24 (2006) (“As late as 1832,
116

Indian Nations satisfied the four conditions for recognition as a State that would be codified
by the International community in the Convention on Rights and Duties of States signed at
Montevideo a little over one hundred years later on December 26, 1933.”).
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period,” Indian Nations continued to make agreements
with the United States, and this practice has continued to
the present day. 117
As political relationships are formed through an understanding of both sides
of the political relationship, the perspectives and expectations of Tribal
Nations for the U.S. government to conform and demonstrate a
commitment to the rule of law has not wavered. Although subsequent eras
of U.S. Indian policy can be classified as expressions of bad faith and
coercion, the foundational relationship and the permanent neighbor status
of the U.S. with Tribal Nations requires a full understanding of both sides
of the political relationship. 118
As Figure 1 (above) illustrates, U.S. Indian policy is often hard to
categorize; for instance, two different points on the pendulum are identified
in the 1800s, the Removal Era and the Reservation Era. On the one hand,
the Indian Removal Act of 1830 was passed to coerce all Tribal Nations east
of the Mississippi River to remove to lands west and relinquish their
homelands through treaties or military action. 119 On the other hand,
reservations were recognized as seats for tribal governance and within the
legal jurisdiction of tribal law and order. 120
The lowest point in U.S. Indian policy for American Indians was
the Assimilation/Allotment Era, where the U.S. government kidnapped
children for so-called civilization training at mandatory military and
religious-run boarding schools, 121 and it determined that certain reservations
were open to allotment, parceling out tribal government-owned lands to
individual tribal citizens. 122 The General Allotment Act was the violation of
treaty-reserved lands under tribal land law, 123 as the U.S. Congress
authorized the executive branch to declare a reservation open for allotment.
Early allotment acts called for tribal consent, but as the U.S. Supreme Court
espoused the “plenary authority” of the U.S. Congress, tribal consent was
not an impediment. 124 The impact of the allotment policy was devastating to
Tribal Nations.
117
118

Id. at 827.
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, n.24 (1974) (describing an employment preference

in the U.S. Bureau of Indian affairs for Indians as a “political” preference as applying to
members of federally recognized tribes).
Pub. L. No. 21-148, 4 Stat. 411; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 103[4][a].
See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (upholding tribal laws on reservations
for acts committed by tribal members against tribal members as outside of the authority of
the courts of the United States).
See Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh Generation, 21
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 50–55 (2008).
See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7–15 (1995).
25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887) (repealed 2000).
See Rice, supra note 116, at 835.
119
120

121

122
123
124
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As a result of the General Allotment Act and federal policy
of allotment, Indian land holdings plunged from 138
million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres by 1934.
Fractionation of Indian interests as individual allotments
were inherited by the decedents of the allottees pursuant to
state inheritance laws resulted in tracts of land that were
unusable by the owners. Colonialist treatment of Indian
Nations and their territories became ingrained into the
“normal” relationship between the federal government and
the Indian Nations. 125
Consequently, the political relationships between Tribal Nations and the
United States were at their lowest points, with the United States seeking, by
every means of force, the opening of reservations in violation of treaties and
agreements. 126 The consequences of the allotment acts and policy will be
discussed at greater length more fully below.
Under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 127 the allotment
policy was finally ended in the first section, 128 with the law promoting
consolidation and adding to the land base of reservations and tribal
communities. 129 This ushered in what is labeled as the Indian SelfGovernment Era of U.S. Indian policy. 130 Companion legislation was passed
as the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, 131 and the Alaska
Reorganization Act of 1938 for Alaska Natives. 132 Although some Tribal
Nations had operated under tribal constitutions, the policy push of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was for the adoption of pre-drafted
constitutions with bylaws by the majority of Tribes. 133
Yet again, during the Termination Era of U.S. Indian policy, the
U.S. Supreme Court persevered with the dispossession of land in the
decision of Tee-hit-Ton Indians v. United States. 134 The Tee-Hit-Ton Clan
of the Tlingit Band of Alaskan Natives sued the United States under the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution for
compensation of timber harvested from the lands they held since time

125
126

Id.
See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903) (stating the “plenary authority”

of Congress to abrogate Indian treaties to open reservation lands to allotment).
25 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (originally 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq.).
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id.

COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 1.05.
EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 62, at 19–20.
25 U.S.C. § 5201 et seq. (originally 25 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.).
Alaska Reorganization Act of 1938, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936).
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 4.04[3][a][1].
348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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immemorial. 135 The U.S. Supreme Court held that federal recognition must
occur prior to any taking for compensation over the land rights of Indians. 136
This leaves unimpaired the rule derived from Johnson v.
McIntosh, 8 wheat. 543, that the taking by the United
States of unrecognized Indian title is not compensable
under the Fifth Amendment. This is true not because an
Indian or an Indian tribe has no standing to sue, or because
the United States has not consented to be sued for the
taking of original Indian title, but because Indian
occupation of land without government recognition of
ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by
the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or
any other principle of law. 137
The decision included derogatory language about Tribal Nations as follows:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of
this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by
force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of
acres by treaty in return for blankets, food, and trinkets, it
was not a sale, but the conquerors’ will that deprived them
of their land. 138
As a result of this decision, Tribal Nations do not have compensable land
rights unless a federal law or instrument documents those land rights. This
decision “has been criticized for misinterpreting precedent and violating
fundamental human rights and constitutional norms of equality.” 139 Once
more, the rule of law was not applied even-handedly for tribal government
land rights when seeking compensation from the U.S. Government.
As the pendulum swung to recognition of tribal governments, the
Indian Self-Determination Era allowed for tribal governments to contract
with the BIA to deliver social programs, law enforcement services, health
care operations, and other treaty-guaranteed federal responsibilities. Tribal
governments were also able to charter tribally-run schools from the BIA and
Bureau of Indian Education 140 with the enactment of the federal Indian SelfDetermination and Education Act of 1975. 141
IV.

135
136
137
138
139
140
141

UNEVEN APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF LAW BY THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT IN RESERVATION LAND DECISIONS

Id. at 276.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 284–85.
Id. at 289–290.

COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, § 15.09[1][d].
25 C.F.R. § 32.3.
25 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (originally 25 U.S.C. § 450).
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The term “Indian Country” is a legal term of art that has been
defined in the criminal statutes of the United States since 1948. 142 Under
federal law, Indian Country is comprised of three types of tribal lands: “a)
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,”
“b) all dependent Indian communities,” and “c) all Indian allotments.” 143
During the Termination Era, state governments challenged the reservation
status of tribal lands by asserting that federal allotment statutes inferred the
diminishment or disestablishment of reservations. 144 A number of these
types of cases have arisen as tribal members challenged state jurisdiction
over criminal prosecutions as invalid within existing reservations. 145

A.

Application of the Indian Country Statute and Upholding
Reservation Status

In the first challenge of this type, the U.S. Supreme Court
reviewed federal laws and found that the state of Washington could not find
an express act of Congress to alter the reservation boundaries of the Colville
Indian Reservation. 146 The Court held that allotments, as understood as the
“issuance of any patent,” did not impact the reservation boundaries of the
Colville Indian Reservation, referencing the 1948 Indian Country statute. 147
The next case involved the state of Oregon seeking the U.S.
Supreme Court to find that the Klamath River Reservation was
disestablished when a treaty fishermen sought the return of his nets from
state wardens. 148 In Mattz v. Arnett, 149 the Court reviewed federal laws and,
specifically, the 1892 allotment statute for the reservation.
In view of the discretionary nature of this presidential
power, Congress occasionally enacted special legislation in
order to assure that a particular reservation was in fact
opened to allotment. The 1892 Act was but one example
of this. Its allotment provisions, which do not differ
materially from those of the General Allotment Act of
1887, and which in fact refer to the earlier Act, do not,
alone, recite or even suggest that Congress intended
thereby to terminate the Klamath River Reservation. See
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 357-358 (1962).
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948).

Id.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Part IV.

Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).

Id. at 357–58.
See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
Id. at 482.
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Rather, allotment under the 1892 Act is completely
consistent with continued reservation status. 150
Reviewing other prior decisions, the Court approvingly cited to the 1909
decision in United States v. Celestine, 151 upholding federal prosecution
within the Tulalip Reservation subsequent to allotment of the reservation. 152
In the Celestine decision, the Court set forth the principle: “when Congress
has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part
of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.” 153
In Mattz, the Court adhered to the legal principle that “[a]
congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of
the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative
history.” 154 The Court refused to infer termination of reservation status
without express language from Congress, which was not present in the case,
and concluded there was no intent to terminate the reservation status,
highlighting several federal laws referring specifically to the reservation postallotment. 155

B.

The Attack of South Dakota and Utah Leading to U.S. Supreme
Court Decisions

In a series of cases involving the state of South Dakota, legal
arguments were made asserting allotment statutes as tools for diminishing
or disestablishing the reservations of the traditional tribal peoples, the Oceti
Sakowin (the Seven Council Fires, also known as the
Dakota/Lakota/Nakota or Sioux Tribes). 156 The Seven Council Fires are:
the Mdewakantonwan, Sissetonwan, Wahpetonwan, Wahpekute,
Ihanktonwan, Ihanktonwanna, and Titonwan. 157 “The first four speak the
Dakota dialect and are referred to as a group as the Isanti (Knife) people.
The Ihanktonwan are now commonly known as the Yankton and speak the
Nakota dialect along with the Little Yankton or Ihanktonwanna. The
Titonwan or Teton speak the Lakota dialect.” 158 In South Dakota, there are
nine Indian reservations, and all are the homelands of the Oceti Sakowin.
150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 497.

215 U.S. 278 (1909).

Id.
Id. at 285.

Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973).

Id. at 504–05.
See Angelique EagleWoman, Re-Establishing the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate’s Reservation
Boundaries: Building a Legal Rationale from Current International Law, 29 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 239, 240 (2005) [hereinafter EagleWoman, Re-Establishing the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Oyate’s Reservation Boundaries].
Id.
Id.
155
156

157
158
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Three major cases will be more fully explored as demonstrating the attack
of South Dakota to undo treaty-established reservations.
In the midst of aggressive assertions by South Dakota to alter
reservation boundaries, the state of Utah also engaged in litigation against
the Uintah Indian Reservation. This U.S. Supreme Court decision and the
resulting factors will be analyzed as well.
V.
THE ATTACK ON THE SISSETON-WAHPETON LAKE
TRAVERSE RESERVATION IN NORTH AND SOUTH DAKOTA
In the 1975 U.S. Supreme Court decision, DeCoteau v. District
159
the Court reviewed conflicting opinions by the Eighth
Circuit and the South Dakota Supreme Court on the issue of whether the
1867 treaty-established reservation boundaries remained intact post- an
allotment act of 1891. 160 The Eighth Circuit, in light of Mattz and Seymour,
held that the Lake Traverse Reservation boundaries remained as
established by the 1867 Treaty between the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe
and the United States. 161 The Eighth Circuit decision stated “Congress
established the Lake Traverse reservation as a ‘permanent’ reservation in
1867. Since that time Congress has not through clear expression or by
innuendo shown an intention to disestablish.” 162 That federal decision
resulted from a lawsuit on behalf of tribal members charged and convicted
within South Dakota, who challenged state jurisdiction within the Lake
Traverse Reservation. 163 In contrast, the South Dakota Supreme Court held
in a case seeking the termination of parental rights of a tribal member,
Cheryl DeCoteau, for her two sons, that the Lake Traverse Reservation was
disestablished by the allotment act of 1891 with only scattered allotments
remaining under federal jurisdiction. 164
It is worth noting that the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe was not
a party to the DeCoteau case and did not file an amicus brief to the U.S.
Supreme Court. In the mid-to-late 1970s, the Tribe was struggling to
maintain economic viability, and it is likely that tribal leadership did not
anticipate the devastating outcome of the U.S. Supreme Court decision. 165

County Court,

159
160
161
162
163
164
165

420 U.S. 425 (1975).

Id. at 430–31.

United States ex. rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 101–02 (8th Cir. 1973).

Id. at 102.
Id. at 100.

DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 428–30 (1975).
See Angelique EagleWoman, U.S.-Dakota War of 1862: Wintertime for the Sisseton-

Wahpeton Oyate: Over One Hundred Fifty Years of Human Rights Violations by the
United States and the Need for a Reconciliation Involving International Indigenous Human
Rights Norms, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 486, 524–27 (2013) (detailing the poverty
conditions for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe as persistent).
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In the 6-3 decision, the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court conducted its
analysis by first reviewing the demographics within the reservation
boundaries as 30,000 non-Indians and 3,000 tribal members. 166 This was a
sharp departure from the legal standard of reviewing whether Congress has
expressly changed a reservation’s status. Next, the Court discussed how
much of the land base remained in trust status as fifteen percent in the
1970s. 167
In reviewing the history of the 1891 allotment act, the Court drew
on local officials’ accounts. This included accounts from those who
pressured tribal leadership to open the reservation, and a heavily excerpted,
unattributed newspaper article titled, “A Big Pow Wow. A Council at Big
Brule to Urge the Opening of the Sisseton Reservation,” dated May 22,
1889, published on the front page of the Minneapolis Tribune, 168 and
allegedly summarized comments from various tribal leaders. 169 These
extraneous sources of perspectives did not fall within the legal principle of
whether Congress had expressly terminated the status of the reservation,
and yet, the Court held that very result.
While acknowledging that the tribal government under its 1966
Constitution stated its jurisdiction based on the 1867 treaty reservation, the
Court held this inconclusive in finding that the reservation had been
disestablished long ago without the Tribe’s knowledge. 170 The majority
appeared to follow the rationale that because the 1891 allotment act did not
explicitly state the reservation existed, then Congress must have intended
that it did not. 171 Using this reasoning flips the standard for altering a
reservation and was unjustly followed in the DeCoteau decision, ostensibly
allowing the state of South Dakota an authority not authorized by Congress.
In sum, the DeCoteau Court majority “discovered disestablishment in the
factors constituting the ‘surrounding circumstances and legislative
history,’” 172 which departed significantly from the clear expression to
terminate by Congress. 173
In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the relevant actions all
occurred within Indian Country as defined by federal law and that the
Court’s majority decision would “tear[] the reservation asunder.” 174 In
reviewing the language of the allotment act, he stated, “[t]here is not a word
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428.
Id.
See A Large Pow Wow: A Council at Big Brule to Urge the Opening of the Sisseton
Reservation, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., May 22, 1889, at 1.
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433–34.
Id. at 443–44.
Id. at 445–47.
Royster, supra note 122, at 32.
166
167
168

169
170
171
172
173
174

Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973).

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 464. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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to suggest that the boundaries of the reservation were altered.” 175 Further,
the dissent focused on the hardship that would be caused by the majority’s
ruling in the resulting checkerboard jurisdiction and the aggressive tactics of
the state. 176
Checkerboard jurisdiction cripples the United States in
fulfilling its fiduciary responsibilities of guardianship and
protection of Indians. It is the end of tribal authority for it
introduces such an element of uncertainty as to what
agency has jurisdiction as to make modest tribal leaders
abdicate and aggressive ones undertake the losing battle
against superior state authority. 177
Legal scholars have criticized the decision as failing to uphold the rule of
law. 178 A legal hornbook highlighted that the dissent was cognizant that the
dispute arose in state court because of “South Dakota’s aggressive assertion
of jurisdiction over Indian children.” 179 Other legal scholars criticized the
Court’s departure from the explicit language of the allotment act and the
failure to properly apply the Indian canons of construction to discern the
Tribe’s understanding of the allotment act in reaching the end of the
spectrum result of disestablishment. 180
Contrary to the majority’s ruling, the U.S. Congress has not
disestablished the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse Reservation. This is
evident from federal law enacted after the 1975 DeCoteau decision. In
1984, the U.S. Congress enacted the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation
Land Consolidation Act to increase the amount of tribally-owned lands
within the reservation boundaries. 181 This action refutes the holding of the
majority in the DeCoteau Court and demonstrates the ongoing recognition
of the 1867 treaty-established reservation and the congressional intent to
fortify the reservation.
Id. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id.
See EagleWoman, Re-Establishing the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate’s Reservation
Boundaries, supra note 156, at 261 (characterizing the decision as “a wrongful taking of land
and resources from indigenous peoples.”) (citation omitted). See also, Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 82 N.D. L. REV. 777, 780 (2006).
See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 72, at 300 (2016).
Id. at § 72, at 301.
See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-513, 98 Stat. 2411, 2411 (1984) (“[T]he
175
176
177
178

179
180
181

provisions of this Act shall govern the right to inherit trust or restricted land located within
such States and within the original exterior boundaries of the Lake Traverse Indian
Reservation . . . as described in article III of the Treaty of February 19, 1867 (15 Stat. 505).”).
Note that the preamble to the law states: “Pertaining to the inheritance of trust or restricted
land on the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation, North Dakota and South Dakota, and for
other purposes.” Id.
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With the tribal government absent from the decision, the
opportunity to rectify the poorly supported DeCoteau decision in federal
courts may still exist. The record before the U.S. Supreme Court was not
fully developed, and the legal standard was not credibly applied. In an
uninterrupted timeline, the U.S. Congress has expressly included the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse Reservation in federal law, 182
congressional hearings, 183 and reports. 184 Likewise, the executive branch, 185
and federal agencies, acknowledge the Lake Traverse Reservation to the
present day. 186 Through the persistent federal acknowledgment of the
182
183

See id.
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-577, at 29 (1988).

Section 217 corrects an error of the Bureau of Indian Affairs with
respect to first year funding for the Tiospa Zina Indian School at the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Reservation in South Dakota. Through an appellate
process in the BIA, it has been determined that the school should have
received start-up costs as a new contract school in fiscal year 1987. The
amendment directs payment from the appropriation from which the
school should have received its funds.
Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 116-206, at 3 (2020).
On October 25, 2017, the Committee held a legislative hearing on the
bill. At this hearing, the Honorable R. Trent Shores, U.S. Attorney for
the Northern District of Oklahoma, U.S. Department of Justice,
testified in support of the goals of S. 1942. The Honorable Dave Flute,
Chairman, Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation,
and Ms. Carmen O'Leary, Director, Native Women's Society of the
Great Plains, both testified in support of S. 1942.

184

Id.
See 163 CONG. REC. S3797-110 (2017) (“The story of the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands

is one of movement of the Native people that made their home on the Lake Traverse
Reservation, where they still celebrate today.”); see also S. REP. NO. 115-220 (2018).
On October 25, 2017, the Committee held a legislative hearing on S.
1870. At the October 25th hearing, officials from the Departments of
the Interior and Justice testified in favor of the bill. The three remaining
witnesses on the panel–Dave Flute, Chairman, Sisseton Wahpeton
Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation; Joel Boyd, Colville Business
Councilman, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation; and
Carmen O'Leary, Director, Native Women's Society of the Great
Plains–also testified in support of the bill.

Id.

See Press Release, White House, President Obama Signs South Dakota Disaster
Declaration (May 13, 2011) (providing “Federal funding is available to State and eligible local
governments . . . as well as those portions of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation,
Sisseton-Wahpeton Indian Reservation, and Standing Rock Indian Reservation that lie
within these counties.”).
See Tribes Served by the Great Plains Region, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR INDIAN AFF.,
https://www.bia.gov/regional-offices/great-plains/tribes-served
[https://perma.cc/J8UM2N7C]; Interior Signs Cooperative Agreement with Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate as Next Step
185

186

in Land Buy-Back Program: Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of Lake Traverse Reservation in
North & South Dakota Join Latest Step in Nation-to-Nation Cooperation to Strengthen
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reservation in the many years after the DeCoteau decision, the majority’s
holding that Congress had inferred termination of the reservation
boundaries through an allotment act would appear to be erroneous. 187

A.

The Attack on the Rosebud Sioux Tribe Reservation in South
Dakota

In the 1977 decision, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 188 the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe filed suit for a declaratory action in federal court
providing that three congressional acts did not alter their reservation
boundaries. 189 In another 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the Rosebud Sioux Reservation was diminished, 190 although the
congressional record relied upon was sparse at best. The majority cobbled
together reasoning to infer congressional intent from three separate acts of
Congress. “Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude
that the Acts of 1904, 1907, and 1910 did clearly evidence congressional
intent to diminish the boundaries of the Rosebud Sioux Reservation.” 191
Because the majority’s rationale required piecing together these three
separate laws, the holding should be viewed as suspect under the rule of law
and not conforming to the legal standard requiring a clear congressional
expression to alter the reservation boundaries. In dissent, Justice Marshall
took issue with the majority’s interpretation of the three-land cession and
allotment acts.
Since congressional intent must be unambiguous before we
can conclude that Congress terminated part of an Indian
reservation, the absence of any express provision to this
effect in the Rosebud Acts strongly militates against the
interpretation the Court places on those Acts. But I need
not rely on congressional silence alone eloquent as it may
be to reject the Court’s interpretation. For both the text of

Tribal Sovereignty, U.S. DEP’T

OF THE INTERIOR INDIAN AFF., https://www.bia.gov/asia/opa/online-press-release/interior-signs-cooperative-agreement-sisseton-wahpeton-oyatenext [https://perma.cc/69WP-9VDY].
See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, granted these Indians a permanent
reservation with defined boundaries and the right to make their own
laws and be governed by them subject to federal supervision, 15 Stat.
505, as amended. No more is asked here; and it must be conceded that
the jurisdictional acts took place within the contours of that reservation.

187

Id.

188
189
190
191

Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 614–15.
Id. at 587.
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the Acts and the circumstances surrounding their
enactment affirmatively point to the opposite conclusion. 192
In addition, Justice Marshall argued for the proper application of the Indian
canons of construction to resolve ambiguities in statutes to be resolved for
the benefit of Indians. 193 This decision seems to be a particularly egregious
violation of the rule of law where the Rosebud Sioux Tribe sought a
declaratory judgment in federal court to counter the aggressiveness of the
state of South Dakota to gain access to reservation lands.

B.

The Failed Attack on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in
South Dakota

In 1979, Cheyenne River Sioux tribal member, John Bartlett, was
charged and convicted in South Dakota state court. Following the
exhaustion of state remedies, he filed a writ of habeas corpus to federal court
challenging state criminal jurisdiction on the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation. 194 The state of South Dakota contended that an allotment act
of 1908 had diminished the reservation boundaries and that state
jurisdiction followed on the relevant portion of land for the criminal
prosecution. 195
In Solem v. Bartlett, 196 Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the
unanimous opinion by setting out the legal analysis for review of reservation
status by synthesizing prior decisions on the “statutory language used to
open the Indian lands” with events surrounding and to lesser extent
occurring after the act “to decipher Congress’s intentions.” 197 In addition,
Justice Marshall signaled approval for a pragmatic approach in finding de
facto diminishment when lands were opened and “non-Indian settlers
flooded into the opened portion of a reservation.” 198
In reviewing the 1908 allotment act, the Court noted that there
was no express language to change the existing reservation boundaries. 199
Addressing the argument by South Dakota that the 1908 act included
language referring to the return of lands to the “public domain” and a
reference to the unallotted lands of the reservation “thus diminished,” the
Court held that these few phrases were not enough to demonstrate
congressional intent to diminish the reservation. 200 The Court referred to
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Id. at 620–21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 617 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Bartlett v. Solem, 691 F.2d 420, 420 (8th Cir. 1982).

Id. at 420–21.

465 U.S. 463 (1984).

Id. at 470–71.
Id.
See id. at 474.

Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 475–76 (1984).
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inconsistency in the understandings of the effect of the 1908 act and
concluded that the record provided no help to either side. 201 As for
demographics in the opened areas of the reservation, the record provided
that tribal members took allotments in those areas, and the attempt to bring
in non-Indian settlers failed. 202
While the result in Solem led to the uninterrupted recognition of
the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, the Court’s willingness to delve into
extraneous factors to bolster its interpretation of the 1908 allotment act
would prove onerous to the defense of other reservations. The result of this
decision was to thwart the attempt by South Dakota to assert criminal
jurisdiction over the allotted portion of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation, 203 but this did not curtail the state’s efforts to attack other
reservations.

C.

The Attack on the Uintah Indian Reservation in Utah

When the Supreme Court of Utah found diminishment of the
Uintah Indian Reservation, the U.S. Supreme Court continued a similar
line of reasoning in the 1994 Hagen v. Utah decision. 204 The Uintah Indian
Reservation was established by Congress in 1864 after an Executive Order
set aside lands in the Utah Territory for the Ute Indian Tribe. 205 In the 7-2
majority decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Hagen
Court clarified the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on carving down
reservation lands by sharpening the following three factors which had been
introduced earlier by the DeCoteau and Solem Courts. 206
In determining whether a reservation has been diminished,
‘[o]ur precedents in the area have established a fairly clean
analytical structure,’ directing us to look to three factors. [1]
The most probative evidence of diminishment is, of
course, the statutory language used to open the Indian
lands. [2] We have also considered the historical context
surrounding the passage of the surplus land Acts, although
we have been careful to distinguish between evidence of
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. at 478–79.
Id. at 480.
See id. at 481.

510 U.S. 399, 421–22 (1994).

Id. at 402.
Id. at 410–11. See also Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 463, 466–72 (employing demographics to a

portion of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation allotted by federal law and rejecting the
argument that the allotment should be construed to diminish the reservation boundaries);
Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.Ct. 1072, 1081–82 (2016) (finding that changing demographics
was the least compelling factor in determining that an allotment act of 1882 did not diminish
the Omaha Indian Reservation).
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the contemporaneous understanding of the particular Act
and matters occurring subsequent to the Act’s passage. [3]
Finally, ‘[o]n a more pragmatic level, we have recognized
that who actually moved onto opened reservation lands is
also relevant to deciding whether a surplus land Act
diminished a reservation.’ 207
These so-called factors stray from the legal standard of whether Congress
explicitly altered a reservation’s boundaries. 208
The Court selected language from a 1902 allotment act plan that
required the consent of the Ute Indian Tribe and contained language on
restoring any unallotted lands to the “public domain” to be sold. 209 Reading
the 1902 language into the actual law that opened the reservation to
allotment in 1905, which omitted the restoration language, 210 the majority
held, in agreement with the state of Utah, that both acts read together had
demonstrated an intent by Congress to diminish the reservation. 211 The Ute
Indian Tribe had persistently withheld consent to allotment as President
Theodore Roosevelt ordered allotment to occur under the 1905 allotment

207
208
209
210

Hagen, 510 U.S. at 410–11 (internal citations omitted, numbering added for clarity).
See, e.g., Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973).
Hagen, 510 U.S. at 412.
See Lauren Natasha Soll, The Only Good Reservation is a Diminished Reservation?, 41

FED. B. NEWS & J. 544, 547 (1994).
[T]he Court discounted the language and surrounding circumstances of
the only act actually implemented--the Act of March 3, 1905--and
instead reached back to the Act of May 27, 1902 to find the restoration
language upon which it ultimately relied to make its conclusion. Citing
Rosebud, the Court insisted that the 1905 Act was merely an
amendment of the 1902 Act and, therefore, the language of the earlier
act necessarily carried forward. In so doing, however, the Court not only
disregarded the rule requiring that all ambiguities must be resolved in
favor of the Indians but also ignored evidence that the circumstances
surrounding the 1905 Act were materially different from those attending
the 1902 Act. For example, the legislature had intentionally erased the
restoration language of the earlier statutes and instead employed the
term “opening” throughout the 1905 Act. Though it concededly is
impossible from the evidence to discern the reason for the erasure, as
the dissenting justices admonished the majority, all doubts should have
been resolved in the favor of the Ute Indian Tribe.

Id.
Id. at 415–16 (“The 1905 Act did not repeat these essential features of the opening,
211

because they were already spelled out in the 1902 Act. The two statutes—as well as those that
came in between—must therefore be read together.”).
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act. 212 The twisted reasoning of the Court then applied the three factors
weighing against the Tribe’s defense of its reservation homelands. 213
In regard to demographics, the Court provided a rather pointed
concern for non-Indians over Indians. “This ‘jurisdictional history,’ as well
as the current population situation in the Uintah Valley, demonstrates a
practical acknowledgment that the Reservation was diminished; a contrary
conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people
living in the area.” 214
In dissent, Justice Blackmun first repeated a quote from another
dissent on the failure of the Court to uphold the treaty rights of Tribal
Nations.
“Great nations, like great men, should keep their word,”
FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142, 80
S.Ct. 543, 567, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting),
and we do not lightly find that Congress has broken its
solemn promises to Indian tribes. 215
Returning to the legal standard for the alteration of Indian reservation
boundaries, Justice Blackmun set forth the legal standard as requiring
express language from Congress and requiring the application of the Indian
canon of construction that ambiguities in statutes be resolved for the benefit
of the Indians. 216 Further, the dissent noted that the majority misapplied the
latter in favor of the state in its interpretation of the surplus land act of
1905. 217
From the Hagen Court, Justice O’Connor ushered in a complete
divergence from the rule of law to allow the U.S. Supreme Court to consider
factors that cannot weigh in favor of Tribes. 218 The first factor is the statutory
See EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide, supra note 6, at
436–38.
Theodore Roosevelt served as United States President from 1901 to
1909, one of the worst United States Indian policy eras, referred to as
the allotment and assimilation era. This era is where social
experimentation was perpetuated on American Indian children and
tribal lands forcibly taken in violation of treaties signed with the United
States.
212

Id.
Hagen, 510 U.S. at 412–22.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 422–24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 424 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Royster, supra note 122, at 41; Richard L. Barnes, A Woman of the West, But Not
the Tribes: Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and the State-Tribal Relationship, 58 LOY. L. REV.

213
214
215
216
217
218

39, 95 (2012).
By using the public domain gambit, Justice O'Connor conflated the use
of the land with the question of who should govern it. It was the
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language, but as noted by the dissent and precedent, interpretation of
treaties, statutes, and other U.S. derived law applied to tribal governments,
ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the Indians. 219 The second factor
on the “contemporaneous understanding” of these allotment and surplus
acts is informed from non-Indians’ writings, newspaper articles, and other
opinion pieces, which will favor dispossession of tribal lands. 220 The third
factor can, but rarely, weighs in favor of Tribal Nations as the Court reviews
the demographics of who settled onto the open lands, as common sense
would provide that Indians usually do not re-settle on their own lands. 221

D.

The Attack on the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota

When the Yankton Sioux Tribe sought a declaratory judgment in
federal court on the basis that its reservation boundaries were unaltered by
a 1894 allotment act, the lawsuit resulted in a contrary decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe. 222 Justice
O’Connor delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court in finding
diminishment occurred more than one hundred years prior to the lawsuit. 223
The impetus for the lawsuit was the attempt by South Dakota to locate a
waste dump with a subpar clay lining within the tribal reservation boundaries
near Lake Andes. 224

Secretary of the Interior, acting in violation of the will of the Tribe and
perhaps Congress, who opened the reservation for settlement and
created the conditions that made it seem less like Indian Country.

Id.
See FLETCHER, supra note 179, at 307.
See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1654 (1996).
219
220

Id.

Bedrock principles of Indian law, applied continuously from the
nation's founding until recently, left Indian country largely to tribal
governance, except to the extent that Congress expressly extended
federal or state jurisdiction or limited tribal powers. Supreme Court
decisions have begun to depart from these foundation principles. Those
decisions have been based essentially on the Justices' subjective
judgments about how they ought to allocate sovereign authority over
non-Indians in Indian country in order to avoid cultural clashes. This
subjectivist approach has now attracted the majority of the present Court
away from the weight of precedent in Indian law.

See Charlene Koski, The Legacy of Solem v. Bartlett: How Courts Have Used
Demographics to Bypass Congress and Erode the Basic Principles of Indian Law, 84 WASH.

221

L. REV. 723, 750 (2009).
522 U.S. 329, 329, 358 (1998).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 341.
222
223
224
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Justice O’Connor applied the sharpened test announced in
Hagen and proceeded to find language of cession, 225 which the Court
interpreted as an intent towards diminishment, although the purpose of
allotment acts was for Congress to buy reservation land to open those
purchased lands to settlers within the reservations. 226 The Yankton Sioux
Tribe asserted that the 1894 act included a savings clause that should be
read to uphold the terms of the 1858 treaty-established reservation. 227
“Article XVIII of the agreement, a saving clause, stated that nothing in its
terms ‘shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty’ and that ‘all
provisions of the said treaty . . . shall be in full force and effect, the same as
though this agreement had not been made.’” 228 The Court failed to apply the
Indian canons of construction in favor of the Indians and instead accepted
the argument of South Dakota that the savings clause should not be so
literally interpreted. 229
To add insult to injury, the Court drew upon the record from a
Council meeting between the starving Yankton Sioux and government
commissioners as focused on “many references to the Government’s failure
to fulfill earlier promises” and no reference to the 1858 reservation
boundaries. 230 Reciting more statements from government officials’ reports,
the Court concluded that the “contemporaneous understanding” of the
1894 allotment act was to diminish the reservation. 231 As for demographics,
the presence of mostly non-Indians with a few Indian allotments was
considered by the Court as a diminishment factor. 232 The Court also
approved of the aggressiveness of South Dakota in asserting “virtually
unchallenged” jurisdiction over the open area of the reservation as
evidencing diminishment. 233
In holding the Yankton Sioux Reservation diminished, 234 the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously betrayed the rule of law in favor of factors
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 345–346.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 354–55.
Id. at 356–57. See James M. Grijalva, Robert Laurence, Alex Tallchief Skibine, Frank
Pommersheim & N. Bruce Duthu, Diminishment of Indian Reservations: Legislative or
Judicial Fiat?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 415, 417–18 (1995). “Any test that starts by saying that it is
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232

looking for ‘clear’ indications of congressional intent and then lists as a factor in determining
the clear intent the present day demographics of the reservation cannot legitimately talk in
terms of clear indications of congressional intent.” Id. at 417 (comment by Alexander
Skibine).
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 357.
Id. at 358.
233
234
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weighing against Tribal Nations due to the constant pressure to dispossess
Indians of their homelands. 235
Thus, four of the above highlighted cases demonstrate the
unceasing attack of South Dakota to gain approval by the highest federal
court in the United States to disrupt and destroy the reservation status of the
Sioux Tribal Nations. Similarly, the above analysis includes a highlighted
case involving an attack by the state of Utah, which proved to be successful
for the state as well in the U.S. Supreme Court. Abandoning the rule of law
in reservation boundary jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court committed
an injustice to the plain language of the Supremacy Clause in the U.S.
Constitution that “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of
the land.” 236
VI.

THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 2020

MCGIRT V. OKLAHOMA DECISION

With the history of twisting the legal standard to find
diminishment intentions in allotment acts, rather than diminishment “clear
expressions,” the treaties between Tribal Nations and the United States
appeared to find little protection or enforcement in the U.S. Supreme Court
regarding the permanent homeland status of reservations. When a
challenge to state criminal jurisdiction arose in Oklahoma on the grounds
that the alleged conduct occurred on the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
Reservation, the outcome was uncertain as the state of Oklahoma had
perniciously denied the existence of any reservations, with the limited
exception of the Osage Reservation. 237
See Judith V. Royster, Decontextualizing Federal Indian Law: The Supreme Court’s 1997–
98 Term, 34 TULSA L.J. 329, 346 (1998).
The Yankton Sioux decision is thus an example of the

235

decontextualization of Indian law. The Court took an arguably
reasonable rule from its prior cases—an “almost insurmountable
presumption” of diminishment if the tribe ceded the surplus lands for a
sum certain—and applied it despite a savings clause that explicitly
preserved “all provisions” of the 1858 treaty which established the
reservation boundaries. If that safeguarding of the reservation borders is
not sufficient to overcome the presumption, then the Court has in effect
created an irrebuttable presumption of diminishment which it will apply
regardless of context.
See id. at 340.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
See Kirke Kickingbird, “Way Down Yonder in the Indian Nations, Rode My Pony Cross
the Reservation!” From “Oklahoma Hills” By Woody Guthrie, 29 TULSA L.J. 303, 320
(1993).
236
237
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The Ruling on the Treaties and Federal Statutes Regarding the
Creek Nation

On July 9, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a longawaited decision on the status of the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation in
Oklahoma. Justice Gorsuch delivered the 5-4 decision in McGirt v.
Oklahoma. 238 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion opened by acknowledging the
traumatic history of the Muscogee Creek Nation in securing a permanent
homeland:
On the far end of the Trail of Tears was a promise. Forced
to leave their ancestral lands in Georgia and Alabama, the
Creek Nation received assurances that their new lands in
the West would be secure forever. In exchange for ceding
“all their land, East of the Mississippi river,” the U.S.
government agreed by treaty that “[t]he Creek country west
of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guarantied to the Creek
Indians.” Treaty With the Creeks, Arts. I, XIV, Mar. 24,
1832, 7 Stat. 366, 368 (1832 Treaty). 239
Next, the opinion explained that Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Seminole
Nation of Oklahoma, challenged state criminal jurisdiction by asserting his
alleged criminal conduct occurred on the Creek Reservation implicating the
federal Major Crimes Act, 240 which is operative within Indian Country. 241
In establishing the framework for the primacy of the role of
Congress in U.S. Indian policy, the majority opinion drew upon the
regulation of commerce by Congress under the U.S. Constitution’s
Commerce Clause and cited to the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause
denoting “federal treaties and statutes are the ‘supreme Law of the Land.’” 242
Misinformed but conventional wisdom tells us that Oklahoma has no
reservations except the Osage Reservation. This same font of wisdom
tells us that contrary to the status of federally recognized tribes in other
states, the state of Oklahoma has jurisdiction over tribal members and
tribal and trust lands in Oklahoma. This broadcasting of conventional
wisdom about the status of Indian government versus state authority
continues despite the fact that federal court decisions for nearly two
decades have not confirmed the misconception that tribal governments
in Oklahoma have a status different from other tribes in the United
States.
Id. at 303–04.
140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020). Justice Gorsuch was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan.
238

239
240
241
242

Id.
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
18 U.S.C. § 1151.

McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462.
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Citing to the Solem decision, McGirt established that the legal standard for
review of the reservation’s status must adhere to congressional authority as
“[o]nly Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish its
boundaries.” 243
In addressing the argument by the state of Oklahoma that the
Creek Reservation did not survive allotment, the majority opinion in McGirt
rejected the argument by first referencing the federal definition of Indian
Country as “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation . . .
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent.” 244 This definition in federal law
demonstrated that Congress intended allotment to allow for non-Indian
settlement within reservation boundaries. 245 In reviewing the statutory
language of both the 1901 Creek Allotment Act and the 1908 Act, the Court
found that over time the arrangement between the Creek Nation and
Congress was adjusted with shifting policies from assimilation to
encouragement for the Creek Nation to adopt a tribal constitution and
bylaws in 1936. 246 Regarding the history of enactments by the U.S. Congress
and the tribal government operations, the Court concluded that “in all this
history there simply arrived no moment when any Act of Congress dissolved
the Creek Tribe or disestablished its reservation.” 247
The Court rejected language from previous decisions of asserted
steps in the analysis on the status of a reservation, in contravention of
argument by Oklahoma that the steps of contemporary understanding and
current demographics were required. 248 Categorizing this argument as
“mistaken,” the Court explained that “[t]here is no need to consult
extratextual sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear.” 249
Further, Justice Gorsuch, speaking for the majority, reasoned that where a
statute does not provide for disestablishment, then there is no purpose in
looking to other types of evidence on the matter. 250
In turn, the Court rejected the substitution of stories for statutes
offered by Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction on the open areas of the
243
244
245
246
247
248

Id.
Id. at 2464.
Id.
Id. at 2466–67. See infra Section III.C.2.
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468.
Id.

Oklahoma even classifies and categorizes how we should approach the
question of disestablishment into three “steps.” It reads Solem as
requiring us to examine the laws passed by Congress at the first step,
contemporary events at the second, and even later events and
demographics at the third. On the State's account, we have so far
finished only the first step; two more await.

Id.
Id. at 2469.
Id. at 2469–70.
249
250
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reservation. 251 First, Oklahoma argued a longstanding practice of prosecuting
Indians within the Creek Reservation and erroneously claimed an
exemption to the Major Crimes Act. 252 Second, the state made arguments
for the Court to take into consideration comments during the Allotment Era
by tribal leadership that the reservation was under threat of disestablishment
and incorrect comments by government officials that the state had criminal
jurisdiction. 253 “Finally, Oklahoma points to the speedy and persistent
movement of white settlers onto Creek lands throughout the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. But this history proves no more helpful in
discerning statutory meaning.” 254
In the face of the arguments by Oklahoma, the Court did not
waver from the rule of law and the legal standard requiring an express act of
Congress to disestablish the Creek Reservation, which had not occurred.
If anything, the persistent if unspoken message here seems
to be that we should be taken by the “practical advantages”
of ignoring the written law. How much easier it would be,
after all, to let the State proceed as it has always assumed it
might. But just imagine what it would mean to indulge that
path. A State exercises jurisdiction over Native Americans
with such persistence that the practice seems normal.
Indian landowners lose their titles by fraud or otherwise in
sufficient volume that no one remembers whose land it
once was. All this continues for long enough that a
reservation that was once beyond doubt becomes
questionable, and then even farfetched. Sprinkle in a few
predictions here, some contestable commentary there, and
the job is done, a reservation is disestablished. None of
these moves would be permitted in any other area of
statutory interpretation, and there is no reason why they
should be permitted here. That would be the rule of the
strong, not the rule of law. 255
With a clear statement that the Court adhered to the rule of law in
determining the status of reservations, the majority opinion in McGirt put
to rest the reasoning asserted in prior litigation by state governments seeking
the demise of reservation status by inserting extratextual sources as having
weight with statutory interpretation.
Oklahoma further argued that, in the alternative,
Congress never established a reservation for the Muscogee Creek Nation,
251
252
253
254
255

Id. at 2470.
Id. at 2470–72.
Id. at 2472–73.
Id. at 2473.
Id. at 2474.
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rather the fee title received by the Tribe was not reservation land. 256 The
state also pushed the theory that the Indian lands should be considered
dependent Indian communities under the Indian Country statute, rather
than a reservation. 257 In response, the majority opinion rebuffed the theory
that the Creek Nation’s fee title was less secure when the Tribe had sought
fee title as protection of the land in negotiating the provisions of the 1833
Treaty with the United States. 258
In the final section of the opinion, Justice Gorsuch discredited the
fears presented by the state and the dissent that the Court’s opinion “could
unsettle an untold number of convictions and frustrate the State’s ability to
prosecute crimes in the future.” 259 Because of criminal law procedure in both
state and federal courts, the majority opinion reassured the state and the
dissent that their fears were “speculative” and that harsher sentencing in
federal courts may not be a risk that some would opt for. 260
Regardless of the consequences for criminal prosecution or the
other fears espoused, the Court articulated that “the magnitude of a legal
wrong is no reason to perpetuate it.” 261 As the dissent and the state asserted
drastic consequences for civil and regulatory matters, the Court countered
that “Oklahoma and its Tribes have proven that they can work together as
partners” and mentioned the many intergovernmental agreements active
with the Creek Nation. 262
In the final words of the decision, the following was expressed on
the long overdue justice in the case before the Court: “Unlawful acts,
performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to
amend the law. To hold otherwise would be to elevate the most brazen and
longstanding injustices over the law, both rewarding wrong and failing those
in the right.” 263

B.

Dissenting to Disavow Reservation Status

Two dissenting opinions were filed in the case. In the first
dissenting opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts was joined with Justices Alito,
Kavanaugh, and Thomas. The second dissenting opinion was filed alone by
256
257
258

Id. at 2474–76.
Id.
Id. at 2475. The Court further rejected arguments by Oklahoma that the Major Crimes

Act did not apply in the state and state criminal jurisdiction was necessary for minor crimes
between Indians outside the purview of that law because Congress had once abolished tribal
courts. Id. at 2476–78.
Id. at 2479.

259
260
261
262
263

Id.
Id. at 2480.
Id. at 2480–81.
Id. at 2482.
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Justice Thomas, raising a procedural issue under state law. 264 Both dissents
reached the conclusion that the Creek Reservation did not survive
Oklahoma statehood. 265
In the dissent led by Chief Justice Roberts, he took issue with the
majority’s determination that the statutory interpretation did not require
resorting to extraneous sources as had been done in prior Court decisions.
Under those precedents, we determine whether Congress
intended to disestablish a reservation by examining the
relevant Acts of Congress and “all the [surrounding]
circumstances,” including the “contemporaneous and
subsequent understanding of the status of the reservation.”
Yet, the Court declines to consider such understandings
here, preferring to examine only individual statutes in
isolation. 266
Reviewing the extratextual record, the Roberts dissent found probative
newspaper commentary by tribal leaders, 267 the lifting of certain restrictions
by Congress on Creek lands, 268 assertion of state criminal jurisdiction, 269 and
the “settled understanding” of precedents. 270 This dissenting opinion may be
summed up in the following line from the opinion: “In addition to their
words, the contemporaneous actions of Oklahoma, the Creek, and the
United States in criminal matters confirm their shared understanding that
Congress did not intend a reservation to persist.” 271

C.

Return to the Rule of Law in Federal Jurisprudence on
Reservation Status

For far too long, the U.S. Supreme Court indulged in bringing the
worst of the Assimilation/Allotment Era policies into the analysis for
contemporary recognition of reservation status. By engaging in extratextual
factors that were unlikely to weigh in favor of continued reservation status,
the decisions prior to the McGirt Court strayed from the rule of law and
statutory interpretation norms applied for every other area of law. 272 To
Id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas raised the
procedural issue of whether the Court should have taken up the case on the question of
federal criminal jurisdiction when state law barred the issue on appeal as not raised in the
state trial court. Id. at 2503.
Id. at 2502–03.
Id. at 2482 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2496.
Id. at 2498.
Id. at 2499.
Id. at 2502.
Id. at 2496.
Id. at 2474 (majority opinion).
264

265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
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determine reservation status, the legal standard is “[t]he first and governing
principle is that only Congress can divest a reservation of its land and
diminish its boundaries.” 273 This standard requires a straightforward
statutory interpretation which the U.S. Supreme Court and all courts
regularly engage in to determine the meaning of legislated laws.
In the field of federal Indian law, the U.S. Supreme Court has
directed the use of Indian canons of construction to fairly interpret treaties,
statutes, and regulations issued for the benefit of Indians. Through the
decisions on reservation status, the Court has rarely adhered to the use of
the Indian canons of construction to interpret ambiguities as the Indians
would have understood the language of treaties and allotment acts. 274 A
constant criticism has been the interpretation of the Court-supplied factor
on “contemporaneous understandings” to override the Indian perspective
with writings from non-Indian sources supporting dispossession of Indian
lands. 275
The third factor focusing on demographics was announced by
Justice Thurgood Marshall in the unanimous Solem decision where the
opened areas of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation led to tribal
members moving into those areas and staying in those areas. This was not
the usual scenario upon the opening of reservation lands under pressure
from White local and national figures to encourage White homesteading
and entry into reservation territories. 276 When the demographics analysis was
applied in the Hagen and Yankton Courts, the destruction of reservation
status was bolstered by noting the number of non-Indians in the opened
areas. A demographics factor is patently unfair as the U.S. has waged a
273

Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984).

See Getches, supra note 220, at 1621–22.
See Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the Ghosts of AllotmentEra Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 131 (2012).
274
275

While the Supreme Court routinely relies on the “justifiable
expectations” of non-Indian purchasers to support rulings that are
adverse to tribes, the Court never uses historical sources to unearth the
true substance of these expectations, nor does it explain why they were
justifiable. These presumed expectations thus form a significant part of
the Supreme Court's justification for impeding tribes from effectively
governing their own reservations, and the Court's use of these
expectations helps to maintain an atmosphere of lawlessness on
reservations.

Id.
See Saito, supra note 57, at 44.
276

Id.

Using this rationale, the Court upheld the 1887 Allotment Act, which
converted collectively held Indian lands into individual allotments and
allowed “surplus” land to be transferred to White settlers, despite the
fact that the law violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
as well as the explicit terms of an 1867 treaty.
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genocidal campaign against American Indian populations over centuries in
sometimes overt methods, 277 and other times indirect actions putting the
Native population at risk. 278 By requiring American Indians to populate
every portion of a reservation to keep reservation status, the U.S. is holding
tribal peoples to a standard found in the religious doctrine of discovery, in
so far as actual possession consummated recognized title. 279 This is a
perversion of reservation status as negotiated to reserve permanent
homelands for the future generations of tribal peoples.
The insertion of allotment acts to analyze the present-day status
of reservation boundaries has been a ploy of dispossession and a violation
of the rule of law. 280 In the Court decisions in this line up to McGirt, there
has been an attempt to convince tribal leaders that their reservations had
been permanently altered eighty to one hundred years prior without any
express language by Congress. 281 With the McGirt decision’s enunciation of
the rule of law, rather than “the rule of the strong,” 282 the legal norms for
Tribal Nations and the United States have been placed back on the right
path and brought the Court’s jurisprudence into the Indian SelfDetermination Era of U.S. Indian policy.
VII.

CONCLUSION: TO RESTORE FAITH IN THE TRIBAL NATIONSU.S. RELATIONSHIP AS PERMANENT NEIGHBORS

A majority of the treaties entered into by the U.S. with Tribal
Nations in the late 1700s and 1800s contained the promise of perpetual
“peace and friendship.” 283 This promise should necessitate recognition of
full human rights, the application of the rule of law to Tribal Nation claims,
and fairness in court decisions. 284
277
278

See DUNBAR-ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 96–102.
See EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide, supra note 6, at

439–47.
See Miller, supra note 17, at 333.
See Royster, supra note 122, at 6–7.
See Dean B. Suagee, A Human Rights-Based Environmental Remedy for the Legacy of
the Allotment Era in Indian Country, 29 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 3, 6 (2014).
Tribal nations continue to live with the detrimental legacy of the
allotment era. The judicially imposed limits on the scope of inherent
tribal sovereignty are an impediment to the exercise of the “on-going”
aspect of the right to self-determination. The effects of allotment policy
can thus be said to constitute a “continuing violation” in international
law.
279
280
281

Id.

McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2474 (2020).
See, e.g., Kirke Kickingbird, What’s Past is Prologue: The Status and Contemporary
Relevance of American Indian Treaties, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 603, 610–11 (1995).
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), is a
282
283

284
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There is a permanent neighbor relationship between Tribal
Nations and the U.S.; Tribal Nations will not abandon their current
homelands and reservation. 285 The U.S. does not intend to cease to exist in
mid-North America. Thus, the time to reconcile the past and provide a way
forward utilizing the rule of law and diplomacy is called for. The U.S. is a
settler-nation state and in honoring the treaty relationships with Tribal
Nations, also asserts legitimacy in securing land title for U.S. citizens under
commonly understood legal principles. 286
For tribal peoples, the impact of leadership decisions and actions
are reviewed for the next seven generations. 287 There is an understanding
that contemporary leadership has a responsibility to do the work now to
provide for the children yet to come. Stewarding and protecting the tribal
homelands is one core responsibility to those future generations. 288
Enforcing treaty rights and seeking redress for the violation of treaty rights
are based in these concepts as well. 289
touchstone for the full human rights that should be accorded in the relationships between
Tribal Nations and the United States. Robert T. Coulter, The Law of Self-Determination
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 15 UCLA J. INT’L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 27 (2010).
In the United States, the right of self-determination in the Declaration
would extend and strengthen self-determination, but it will not create
any great change. The principal effect is likely to be to discourage the
restriction or denial of the right by the federal government. In Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, Justice Marshall asserted that Congress could
alter or eliminate Indian nations' powers of self-government. The UN
Declaration has created or will create a rule of customary international
law that the United States cannot exercise such a power to deprive
Indian nations of their right of self-determination or self-government.

Id.
Id.
285
286

Tweedy, supra note 275, at 187.
This information suggests that non-Indians who purchased lands on
reservations in many cases did not have justifiable expectations that they
would take their land free and clear of any continuing tribal interest.
This is because knowledge of such injustice conflicts with the ordinary
meaning of justifiable expectations, and knowledge of an unjust taking
should be interpreted to constitute notice that tribes may have some
continuing interest in the lands.

Id.

Graham, supra note 121, at 47 (quoting The Great Law of the Haudenosaunee as “[i]n
each deliberation, we must consider the impact of our decisions on the next seven
generations.”).
Cris Stainbrook, Indian Lands—Passing Our Most Treasured Asset to Future Generations,
MESSAGE
RUNNER,
https://iltf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Message-Runner-2lowres.pdf [https://perma.cc/45RJ-TZZA].
Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty
Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1619 (2000).
287

288

289
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Another key responsibility lies in public education. 290 As the
permanent homelands for both Tribal Nations and the United States were
established by treaties, executive orders, congressional land recognition acts
and settlement acts, this basic foundation for the lands within the U.S.
should be taught at all levels of education. 291 The lands comprising Turtle
Island are the sacred homelands of many Tribal Nations. 292 More land
acknowledgments are being incorporated into mainstream U.S. educational
institutions and other entities. 293 “An Indigenous land acknowledgment
involves making a statement recognizing the traditional territories of the
Indigenous peoples who have lived on the land before the arrival of
settlers.” 294 With a greater sense of the importance of the rule of law, the
Native Americans have consistently employed the discourse of treaty
rights to gain recognition for the land and resource rights that have been
wrongfully appropriated from them, to assert sovereign rights, and to
compel the federal government to carry through on its trust obligations.
Although treaty rights are commonly understood as political rights, they
also have fundamental importance to the cultural survival of Native
American people. Thus, in many ways, the discourse of treaty rights for
Native Americans is responsive to international human rights law, which
speaks to the obligation of national governments to ensure the cultural
survival of distinctive ethnic groups.

Id.
See EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide, supra note 6, at 424.
290

Id.

In the relationships between Tribal Nations and the United States, myth
and storytelling have been and continue to be powerful tools in
perpetuating the subjugation of and human rights violations against
American Indians in judicial decisions, American history textbooks, and
the mainstream media. The dehumanization of American Indians is a
tradition that stems from the founding of the United States.

Cynthia Ford, Integrating Indian Law into a Traditional Civil Procedure Course, 46
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243 (1996); Samantha A. Moppett, Acknowledging America’s First
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Sovereign: Incorporating Tribal Justice Systems into the Legal Research and Writing
Curriculum, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 267, 268–70 (2010).
Nevertheless, the majority of law students are graduating from law
school with little, if any, knowledge of this third sovereign—Indian tribes.
Rather, American Indian tribal governments and tribal justice systems
are completely omitted from most first-year curriculums. By failing to
expose students to the tribal justice systems, law schools are not
adequately preparing students to practice in today's legal arena. In
addition, the failure to acknowledge the third sovereign entity
marginalizes an entire culture. Indeed, Indians have been described as
the ‘unknown minority.’

Id.
See King, supra note 2, at 466 (explaining the Haudenosaunee Creation Story of Turtle
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Island).
Monika Batra Kashyap, Unsettling Immigration Laws: Settler Colonialism and the U.S.
Immigration Legal System, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 548, 575–77 (2019).
Id. at 575.
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homelands of the Tribal Nations and the United States may one day be
home to peoples of perpetual peace of friendship on both sides of the
treaties. The ruling in McGirt v. Oklahoma was one step closer to that
promise. 295

See Kolby KickingWoman, Supreme Court Ruling ‘Reaffirmed’ Sovereignty, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY (July 9, 2020), https://indiancountrytoday.com/news/supreme-courtruling-reaffirmed-sovereignty-4KQXSMEtlUW4lpBGSw6pzA
[https://perma.cc/G3ZTLNRZ]. “‘Many folks are in tears,’ said [Jonodev] Chaudhuri, ambassador of the tribal
nation. ‘Despite a history of many broken promises, as is true with many tribal nations, the
citizens feel uplifted that for once the United States is being held to its promises.’” Id.
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